

MVR-25x


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Cybersecurity

User manual



Improve
Tomorrow



1. Introduction

1.1 Document information.....	3
1.2 Purpose and scope.....	3
1.3 Disclaimer.....	4
1.4 Copyright.....	4

2. Cybersecurity principles

2.1 Summary of recommendations.....	5
2.2 Device identity and trust levels.....	5
2.3 Secure commissioning and initial configuration.....	6
2.4 Communication ports and services.....	7
2.5 Time synchronization.....	8
2.6 User Access Control (UAC) and role management.....	8

3. Cybersecurity operation

3.1 Firmware updates.....	10
3.2 Backup and restore.....	10
3.3 Logging and auditing.....	10
3.4 Recovery plan.....	10
3.5 Reporting vulnerabilities.....	11
3.6 More information.....	11

1. Introduction

1.1 Document information

This document uses the following notation for the various sections in the MVR USW configuration and setting software as well as the keyboard:

- Navigation paths are in italics (e.g. *Tools → Events and Logs → Event History*).
- MVR USW main menus are in bold (e.g. the **Protection** menu).
- Tabs are in italics (e.g. the *Line Protection Module* tab).
- Section names within tabs are in single quotation marks (e.g. the 'CB control block' support functionality)
- Parameter names are in bold and italics (e.g. the ***Master node status*** parameter).
- Parameter drop-down menu items and text values are in double quotation marks (e.g. "Sub-unit").

Additionally, this document uses the following notices, cautions, and warnings to highlight information that is especially important for the user.

NOTICE



Notice

These messages indicate relevant factors and conditions to the concept discussed in the text, as well as other relevant advice.



CAUTION



Caution

These messages indicate a potentially hazardous situation which, if not avoided, could result in personal injury, equipment/property damage, or software corruption.



DANGER!



Danger!

These messages indicate a hazardous situation which, if not avoided, could result in serious personal injury or death.

1.2 Purpose and scope

This document provides technical guidance for securely configuring and operating MVR-25x devices. It is intended for system integrators, control engineers, and commissioning technicians responsible for deploying and maintaining the device in industrial control systems.

The guide covers cybersecurity practices during engineering, installation, and commissioning phases, as well as ongoing operations. It includes instructions for securing both local access through the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) and remote access through the MVR USW software.

The device is designed for use in isolated networks which have no direct internet connectivity. The device should be installed behind a firewall and only communicate with equipment within the same zone.

If you have discovered a security vulnerability in any of our products, services, or systems, we encourage you to report it to us according to our Vulnerability Disclosure Policy.

Firmware updates are released as frequently as necessary based on exposed vulnerabilities. The latest firmware update must be applied as soon as possible to minimize the risk of a possible cyberattack.

The minimum firmware requirement to cover all cybersecurity features described herein is v2.5.7.1-AP2. The minimum MVR USW software requirement is v1.5.4.

1.3 Disclaimer

DEIF A/S reserves the right to change any of the contents of this document without prior notice.

The English version of this document always contains the most recent and up-to-date information about the product. DEIF does not take responsibility for the accuracy of translations, and translations might not be updated at the same time as the English document. If there is a discrepancy, the English version prevails.

1.4 Copyright

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2. Cybersecurity principles

2.1 Summary of recommendations

To maintain a secure deployment of MVR-250 devices, configuration engineers must:

- Disable all unused services and ports.
- Define and implement user access control policies.
- Regularly update firmware using signed packages issued by DEIF.
- Back up configuration settings before applying updates.
- Review settings after an update to ensure they align with security requirements.
- Periodically review audit logs to identify and address anomalies.
- Ensure device clock is synchronized with external time sources for accurate logging.
- If you suspect a device has been compromised, follow the recovery plan.

By following the procedures in this document, you will ensure the device operates securely and remains resilient against internal threats and misconfigurations.

2.2 Device identity and trust levels


All new devices are shipped with factory-installed host certificates, which are used to establish the device's authenticity during communication with the configuration software. Each certificate is unique and signed by DEIF's root certificate authority. These host certificates serve as a trusted identity for the device. When a connection is established, the configuration software verifies the device's certificate signature against the embedded root key.

Devices that have been updated from non-secure firmware versions (prior to v2.5.7.1-AP2) were not provisioned with a secure identity at the time of manufacture. Although these devices can be upgraded to a secure firmware version, they lack verifiable certificate chains and instead rely on self-signed certificates. Self-signed certificates allow encrypted communication and integrity checks, but they do not prove the authenticity of the device. The configuration software cannot verify whether the device is genuine or potentially compromised.

Only devices that either shipped with secure firmware and factory certificates, or have been correctly re-provisioned by DEIF, are recognized as compliant with the current security model.

Information about the certificates of the currently connected device can be seen from the lock icon next to the IP address (see the screenshot below).

Figure 2.1 Location of the certificate icon in MVR USW



There are three different levels of trust for the communication, as shown in the thermometer to the right of the lock icon. When the lowest third of the thermometer is white, the device has an older firmware; when the both the bottom and the middle parts are in yellow, the device has been updated from a non-secure firmware version; and when all three parts are in green, the device has been signed by DEIF's production team. Please see the examples below of each situation.

Figure 2.2 Device with older firmware




Figure 2.3 Device which has been updated from a non-secure firmware version




Figure 2.4 Device which has been signed by DEIF



2.3 Secure commissioning and initial configuration

Upon receiving the device, the first step is to ensure that the MVR USW software and the device's firmware are up to date. The latest software for both are available in the software section of our website (<https://www.deif.com/software/>).

During setup, connect to the device via the configuration software using an isolated engineering workstation. Ensure that the workstation is clean, patched, and not connected to any internet-facing networks.

To ensure best security practices during initial configuration, use the front service port for this connection, as it provides a direct and controlled interface to the device. All other external communication interfaces should remain disconnected until the device has been fully configured and secured. The communication channel between the configuration software and the device is protected using TLS 1.3.



CAUTION



Do not connect the front port to external systems

The front port should never be connected to any external systems!

2.4 Communication ports and services

During engineering, only the necessary ports required for operation should be enabled, and unused interfaces should remain disabled throughout the lifecycle of the device.


The device uses the following ports by default, as listed in the table below:

Table 2.1 Default ports

Port	Direction	Protocol	Service	Comment
21	IN	TCP	FTP	Disturbance record transfer, read-only
6969	IN	TCP	SSH/SFTP	Maintenance access (on front port only)
1551	IN	TCP		Configuration/parametrization (MVR USW) with TLS 1.3
1552	IN	TCP		Access with TLS 1.3 (disabled by default)
4321	IN/OUT	UDP		Proprietary protocol for device discovery and network loop detection

These services can be configured in MVR USW, from the **Communication** main menu, its *Connections* tab, and the 'Ethernet Security Settings' section (see the screenshot below). Each service can be disabled independently. Additionally, you can disable the Ethernet interfaces completely.

Figure 2.5 Ethernet security settings in MVR USW



All communication protocols are disabled by default. They can be enabled from the **Communication** main menu, in the *Protocols* tab. The default communication ports have been listed in the following table:


Table 2.2 Default communication ports

Port	Direction	Protocol	Service	Comment
102	IN	TCP	IEC 61850	IEC 61850
502	IN	TCP	Modbus	Modbus TCP
2404	IN	TCP	IEC 104	IEC 60870-5-104
20000	IN	TCP	DNP	DNP3 TCP
		NA	GOOSE	IEC 61850 GOOSE, Layer 2

2.5 Time synchronization

Different time synchronization methods can be enabled in the **Communication** main menu, in the *Synchronization* tab (see Figure 6 below).

Figure 2.6 Time synchronization settings in MVR USW



Accurate time is essential for security functions like logging and certificate validation. On boot, the device attempts to sync with the configured NTP server. For higher precision, PTP is also supported.

The time synchronization ports have been listed in the table below:

Table 2.3 Time synchronization ports

Port	Direction	Protocol	Service	Comment
123	OUT	UDP	NTP	Time synchronization
		NA	PTP	Precision Time Protocol, Layer 2

NOTICE

Layer 2

The protection device also uses Layer 2 for services like GOOSE and PTP time synchronization, which should be considered in the network design!

2.6 User Access Control (UAC) and role management

The device supports a four-tier User Access Control (UAC) model.

The following roles are predefined:

- User: Can view any menus and settings but cannot change any settings. Cannot operate breakers or other equipment.
- Operator: Can view any menus and settings but cannot change any settings. Can operate breakers and other equipment.

- Configurator: Can change most settings such as basic protection pick-up levels or time delays, breaker control functions, signal descriptions etc. and can operate breakers and other equipment.
- Super user: Can change any setting and can operate breakers and other equipment.

NOTICE



Set passwords during commissioning

As a factory default, no user level is locked with a password in a device. During commissioning, the super user must set a password and configure the desired settings!

User Access Control settings can be found in the **Monitoring** main menu, in the *User Access Control* tab (see the following figure).

Figure 2.7 User Access Control settings in MVR USW

UAC Settings

Enable user group - Operator

Enabled

...

Enable user group - Configurator

Enabled

...

Minimum password length

1

1..128 [1]

...

Number of fail attempts before lock

3

1..1000 [1]

...

Lock period after max fail attempts

0

0..86400000 [1]

s

...

HMI session period before logout

900

5..86400 [1]

s

...

Setting tool session period before logout

900

5..86400 [1]

s

...

UAC Management

Enable UAC management

Disabled

...

Enable default passwords

Disabled

...

Password change interval - Operator

0

0..1000 [1]

day(s)

...

Password change interval - Configurator

0

0..1000 [1]

day(s)

...

Password change interval - Superuser

0

0..1000 [1]

day(s)

...

Password expired - Operator

False

...

Password expired - Configurator

False

...

Password expired - Superuser

False

...

Default password unchanged - Operator

False

...

Default password unchanged - Configurator

False

...

Default password unchanged - Superuser

False

...

Password last changed - Operator

01/01/1970 00:00:00

...

Password last changed - Configurator

01/01/1970 00:00:00

...

Password last changed - Superuser

01/01/1970 00:00:00

...

3. Cybersecurity operation

3.1 Firmware updates

The devices can only be updated using digitally signed packages issued by DEIF. Updates are installed through the configuration software. Before applying any update, the device performs a chain-of-trust validation using embedded cryptographic keys. Any update that fails signature verification is rejected.

NOTICE



Make a backup

Before updates, back up the configuration settings to a secure workstation. After an update the settings should be thoroughly reviewed to ensure that the device operates according to the intended configuration and security requirements!

3.2 Backup and restore

All settings and configuration of the device can be backed up and saved by the user. Backup procedure is simply storing the '.aqs' configuration file that is retrieved from the device using the setting tool.

To restore the settings and configuration from backup storage, the user can write the complete '.aqs' configuration file back to the device using the setting tool.

3.3 Logging and auditing

The device maintains an internal log of system events, security actions, and user access records. These logs are accessible through the configuration software.

Audit logs should be reviewed periodically to identify anomalies. Engineers should also verify that the internal clock is synchronized with an external time synchronization to maintain accurate timestamping.

3.4 Recovery plan

In the event of a suspected compromise or malicious attack against a device, follow the recovery procedure below.

1. Isolate the device. Disconnect the device from all networks. Do not power it off.
2. Document symptoms. Note what triggered suspicion (unexpected behavior, unusual traffic, tamper evidence) with timestamps. Note the device serial number and firmware version.
3. Contact us and ship the device to us for hardware-level inspection and re-provisioning. This is the only way to fully ensure the device is safe.
4. If return is not possible perform a field reset.



CAUTION



A field reset might not be enough

Field reset doesn't detect hardware tampering or modifications below the firmware layer. Factory hardware inspection is the only way to fully verify device integrity.

- Using an isolated laptop not connected to any networks, try to obtain the current configuration from the device using MVR USW software for forensics analysis.
- Perform a factory reset.

- From a separate trusted computer, download the latest firmware from our website. Transfer it to the isolated laptop via USB drive and re-flash using the "Upgrade firmware" functionality in the MVR USW. Do not reuse local copies of the firmware, always download fresh to ensure the files have not been tampered with.
 - Rotate all credentials and keys used.
5. Revoke access. Regardless of path chosen, revoke all credentials and keys the device had access to and monitor connected systems for anomalous activity.

3.5 Reporting vulnerabilities

You can report a vulnerability or detected security issue to DEIF: security@deif.com

Include as much additional information as possible in your report. This can include:

Information	Notes
Requester	Your contact email
Subject	Outline of the issue
Type	Security vulnerability/incident
Product	The affected product(s)
Software version	The firmware and USW versions
Description	Text description of the vulnerability or incident.
Attachments	• Log files • Configuration files



More information

See [Vulnerability disclosure on the DEIF website](#).

3.6 More information

See the DEIF website for general cybersecurity information: [Cybersecurity on the DEIF website](#).